Abst ract
Today. moSI firms provide equity-based Ineenllve eo mlXn.a1lon to thcn non-execut,,'e direc tors, We summarize viewpoints s upport,,'e and critic al of thrs development. We argue thaI the effect iwness of incent;ve compcnSJllOn IS relaled to the struClure of the mcenllve pay contact.
We doscuss!he usc of op tions and shares as well as the Issue of whether mcem",'c pay sho uld bẽ eared towa rd "UTTen l rewards or future Lt\C entlve. ' , We also d,s cms the cnllcat ISSUe of mamtalnlng lhe ownershIp exposure of direc tors by providmg suffiCIent levels of eq u;ty as wcl l as placing re stnelions on cashing out. Using OUT argun'lems above, we suggest glllde line' for c(lnSlruclin g an opllma l eonlract. lVe c"mpare 289 ", cenl i"C pla ns offered by p ublic compames m the US dunng 1988-1998 ami find that plans ucv late Slgm ti cantly from the opllmum, T he Design o f Ince n t ive Co m pe nsa tio n fo r Directo r s In 1989. the board of Ge neral Eleemc Corponlllon (GE) voted to ofTer stock opllo ns to us nonexecunve directors (hereafler, simply d Lfcetors) . For the first llme, GE d,rectors would have their ann ual compe nsatio[\ directly tied to their <hareholders' fortunes. Dlrecto" were glYC." an annUllI o ption grant of up to 1,500 shares wIth an exerelse price equal to the prevailing share pflce. The opllons were exercisable m four cqual annual msrallmcnts and cxplred In 10 years.
Interestingly. the annual option grant was designed as an addition to an already competitive compensation package eomaL n,ng an annual reta iner of$25,000 Jnd a fcc of$I ,200 per m~'<:tmg, GE waS in thc van~uard of the move to offer stock options to d"""tors. In a 1992
Conference Board survey of large eorpora!Lons III the UnLlcd Slates, only 45% of the companlcs sun..,yed repo ned 10 have tncluded some slocks m almua! compensation for dllc"'lors, In contrast, m a SI milar sun'ey in 1997, more than 80% of the firm. offered SOmC form of equity · based compen sation to their d lfeClolO , What is k hmd this phcnomt."on? Why are so many US finn s j umping on this bandwagon'! Whatissues should fin ns consider when o ffenng mcenll\'< pay to their directors'! Our paper has the fo llowing obJeclL,," s. We summJnze the preVJ llmg arguments and anecdotal evidence on director incemlve pay using both academic and bu,mcss sources, Wl' thcn ldentify practic al implementatIon ISsues concernmg the destgn of dirl'<:tor Ineentlvc compensalion arrangcments and provide evidence on the current stale of such practices by repomng on 289 plans adopted by US firms dun ng the period 1988· 1998. Why Usc Incco tiw Co mp en ,at ion for No n-£ ,~",' u t i "e Olrectors ?
We define d,rector L ncentive co mpensation as the u", of stocks, stock option" and other equ ity-based com perlsalion as all imegral pan of thc direclo r's compensa tion package . Pro" iding finatJqal Incentives 10 dtreCiOO can encour age dr5lfable behavior such as active mon;1Oring of Boards should ha ve an 'mplieit undersmndmg or exph cll requncmem tha i new members must invest in the stock of the company. While the lmhal m\'estmcm cou ld vary. It should seldom be less than $100,000 fj-om the new board member' s personal f"n ds, this investment would force new board members to rceogIllzc from the outset that their deCISions affect their own wealth as well as that o f remote Shareholders. Over the long term the mwstment ean be made much largcr by options or stock·based , ompens.allon, 'me [eC~."t trend to pay some board member fees In stock or opno", is a move In lhe right dire,tlon, Discouraging board members Irom "'llmg IhlS equny IS Important SO that holdings will .ccumulate to a significant Sl2C over lime,
The main element of the dirc<:tor pay plan advocated by Jensen IS thaI a subSllont,,1 amount of a director ' s wealth is pUt at risk. Jensen argues that newly ap[l<llllted d" octors~hould Inve~t a minimum o f $100. 000 on equity usi"g~rSQ"1l1 flmds. In additio n, compJIlIes~hould onable directors to build on this initial equity investment by compensat ing them with equllybased mstru mcnts in lieo of the usual ann ual cosh retainer. These sequential aelions w,1 1 encourage di m:tors to aecum ulatc signific ant cquil}' ove r t ime and gene rate 'ownership eX[l<lsure. However. dlreetors eJn~ountera~t and reduce ownership exposure by Iiquid Jtll1g thetr equity [l<lw ;ons Direct ors Can also u:;c financial derivatives such as (p ut) "p tion. , as risk manage ment touls to rcduce th<:lr ",,"ership cxpos ure, Therefor e, a key deSign feature of an etTcetlw di" e(or mccntlvc plsn is the imposition of rcstrictions on salt of the equity mstruments awarde<!. Furth, rm,x c. directors should also be constrained from using financlal dem" tlws to reduce their o,,"erShlp expos ure, With these sequential and , omplemcntary steps. dircctor compensauon can be an effective teet to align the interests of di... ,<: tors and shareholdcrs. Thc Nalional Association o f Corporate Directors (NACO . 1995) supports thIS poSition , In the 1995 BI",~Ribbrm Commission Report Oil Direclor Cu mpe"'iI1liOll. the NACD prup<1ses "boards should pJY direl'lors so lely in th, form of stock and cash o n with «J uity represennng a substanl1 JI portion of the lolal up to 1000/ . " Whilc Jenscn defincs an initial Icvel ho ld ing of at Icast St 00,000, the NACD suggests an eventual target o f $600,000 for directors of l arg~companL~S.
The idca of provid ing dil"<'ctors WIth equ lly-based incetllives SQ that they can allam a nK'anmgfu l IFel of o"''tlers hip cxlXlSurC has~alncd widesprcad acceptancc in thc US Sharcholder interes t groups m pameular tend to concur with th,s prcsenption. Two mflucnnal pension funds, T1AA-eREF and Califomia Publie Employces ' R~t i rel ne nt System (CAL-PERS), suppo rt the idea that di rectors ShOllld maintain a minimllm own~rsh ip I~vel in the company' s stock (Koppes, 1996) , For instance. CALPERS advocates that at least 50% of the director' s tota l compen,ation should be '" company Stock.. Ktngdom, Derek lli ggs advocates the u,c o f fees and discourages thc use of sha rcs and opuons (Higgs, 2(03) . In panicular. Higgs rccomme nd, thaI in addition to specify ing the ccnditions for e xercise. the shares thus oblamcd should be held unhl one year aflcr thc non-exeeut,,·c director lea"es the board. Th is recommendation ,s ba,~d on ,"forma tio n oblained from a , un 'ey o f UK directors and c halmlcn .
Once a finn decides to offer HKe nti\'e pay to its d"~to's. n has to design an effec!tve package that o tters tncenuve s. Ilow can firms !.>est Implement mcent lve pay for directors? In the following discussion, we idenlify key ;mplemenlallOn Issue. ' concernmg the pJra mctcrs of the compensJtion package. In general. these i ssu~s pen . in to tile form of th~.ward . the pre· ct>nditions for the award and the restn ctions Imposcd on the .wa rd~es l$.ru e #1: Opl;O" . '· or !iroch-? TIle kev to offerm g inc( ntiycs Iii to incr( .w a dirccwr's ownership exposu rc hy mcluding~quity-baiied comooncnts 10 thc comlx:mallOn pacb gc, Two main ways ,n which finn s (lffer ;neenll ves are aw.rd, of iihar~s , nd stock opllons. In both cases. fi rms sho uld try 10 restrict the cash cut proc~ss. In Ih~, ' ii~(If restrloled shares. dlfeolors ca n oc prohibited rrom se lling tl,e shares before a eel1ain d. le, " hioh ma)-Of m3Y n(ll be relal ed to thc d ir.. ><:IOr's tc nurc.
In the oa"" of 5Iock oplions. firm can reslnct resale and constram option e.ercisc by stipul.tlng a long "eslI ng period.
Options and restricted shareii differ L n Ihe" sensitIvity to firm pcrformllnce and hence In their nsk levels. Restric ted sh.res offer . lower risk .nd reward pro file th. n opllons. WhIle option ,-.Iues Ca n reaeh zero, shares are r. rely worthkw 11,u<, restricted sh.res often provide grealer value to dircctor< th.n oplions when jinn perfonnance decl ine,. In th" context, restric ted sh.res .rc Ie. " risky . lld provide greater reword to the d trc><:lors.
Stock options are more commonly U3ed In Incentive contrnclS . Their attrac tweness hes
In thclr Iew rage and the "bi lity to selcct thcrr exercise priec. I'i'st. options are I~veraged Instrum~-n l s. Opt, on values can increase dramJtlc.l ly In percent.ge t~l11lS wh~n the underlying asset increases in value Thus d,,~etors are glv~n the opportunity tQ Increase theIr wealth dram' lIe. lly by working to ,nae.", share prices. Second, Smce opllons arc granted wIth . fixed xe1\: i "" pr ie~, th~y o ffer the .d,,,ntage of downs ide risk if firm value docs not achieve a certain threshold. If the share price is below the excrcI'" pnce, the optIOn is nCI valu.ble, ConSider a finn that oft"rs lis dire ctors options m heu of a portlOn of the retainer. Here. the consequence of poor perfo rmance would be a lower than usual remuneration. Thus, by setting appropria te leveh of the exerd se pne e. fimlS can proVIde thdr directors with powerful Incenllves .
Iss"e #2: r" Gil'e '''cem;,·c, ' If 
WaITen Suffcn. m hi. 1994 annua l letter to shareho lders of S erh lm e HJ1h,,',ay Inc" "'ntes "' Ironically, the rhetoric about options frequently descr ibes them as desi",blc because they put mana!.'Crs and owners in the same fmanclal boat. In reality. the boats arc far different. No owner has ever escaped the burden of capita l costs, whereas a holder of a fixed-price option bears no capital costs a t all , An owner muSt weIgh upside potent ial agaInst downside ns k; an option holde r has no do"midc (Cunn ingham, 20(1)," Implicil in Bilftet' s crit icism is tho fact that managers do not bear eapnal costs lx.'<:a usc they arc gl"en options (or sharn ) wnho ut reqUiring a monetary .acnfiee, The same critICIsm also applies to proVIdingdlrc-<;tors WIth shares or options . To allevlale lh,s concern, finns should Impose capital costs by reqlllnng dIrector. to purchase these mstrumcnts with thelr personal funds, Alternatively, finns can also encoumge directors to "' bUY" eq uity_ba ...d incenllves by g,,~ng up a portIon of their casb retamer. That " . f,nns call pay dlr cclors wllh lI1CenllVes L n !reu of thc annual cash retainer. By taking these actio", firms can prevent the" dire ctor lncent" .., comp,:nsatlon from assumIng a bonus-like form.
Ho we'-er, there is another con"derallon thai argues for a bonus-like structure for d,reclOr mcenti vc compensatio n. Like manager)al compensallon. dll"tC19r eOJTll)(:n satjon can slm uliaru:ously conta m both incentl"e and reward compone nts Wh,le ineenti"c compo nents compensate d"c-ctors for fUlure pcrfoml ance. ,""ward components compensale directors for past perfonnance. The bla"kct proviSlOn of OpILO", and restricted shares, 'lTC SpcCtlve of pasl pcrforma" ce proVIde IllcennveS lO Improve fUlure performa nce but do not reward dlrc<:tor ror past perfonnance achie vement , Arb'\lably. a reward component in the compensatIOn package may provide equ ally Imponant alrgnmcnl of director incentives for two rea sons. First. the s reward may seC','e as a periodic Slgnalmg or feedbac k IlIechamsm to re,nforee desirable performance behavior and thus elicit higher levels o f such behavior leading to improved futurc perfOMnance (Luthans , 1999) ~econd , by prov L dmg addl1lOnal shares or opuons for pa>.! performance, the leve l of mcentl"" also rises Thus, the re is an imphcll eorrela llon between the reward and meenUve co mponents To ach,evc rbcsc purpose s. firms should var)" lhe amount of lhe grant based no curre nt Or past performance 00 as to link mccntive a wards to paSl perfom'anee aeh ie,."ment.
Are ·'Ues t Practic es" Followed ?
We now re pon on 289 dtrector mccOli,'c contracts adopted durm 8 19 88 _1998. Our data arc derived from Gerety (200 I), who study stock price "'actinns 10 the adoptIon of dtrt:ctor mccntivc plans. The sample covers 11 years and repr.sents lhe intlial c.~p<:ricnce of firms that providc ineenti,·c pay l'or direct ors. \\,'e focus on two important aspecls of these plans ; the nature II of the equ ity-ba sed mstrument used and whet her the mccntrve is gravy_like on that It does not rcqurrc tradeoff o f an existing retainer. We ident ify plans that solely use op tions. restricted shar es or (unrestneted) stoc k awards and find that the majonty of the plans (152 of 289) use solely op tions r"r the Incen tive co mpone nt. Th e typ,cal oplioo plan entails an annual grant of opt,ons on 1.000 s hares w,th an exercise price equal to the preva ,ling share pn ce: tbe "est ing period is typic ally 0-4 years: the maturny is typ ically 10 year< The number of re stncled share s and stock award plans are 4? and J I respect " 'e1y TAKEINTABLE J We also rcpo n on thc number of grJ"}' p lans, Wc lind that moSt plans 1222 QUt o f 289) providc incentive awa rds as ··...ravy'· in add ilion 10 nist in... cash eompc n:>a tion, In these plans, the directors are n01 req uired to give up any of lheir curren t pay to receive the incco1i,'c awards .
As we have discussed previously, dir~tor com pensat ion can lake on a "bonliS" tla vc r if Incentive a"'ard s are cont ingent on ach LC\'cmcnt of paSt pcrfonnance goals . Howc "cr , wc lind Ihat almost nonc of these plans tlnk lhe a"'a rd, to pasl liml perfonnancc. Th us, we ca ll these gra"y plans , Earli er, we had note d that Ihc le'-ct of dlrcctor co mpensauon has risen ," reCent t,me , . Clcurly, these gravy plans h"vc con1ribut e<.! to this mereaSi:.
The above issues are best hlghloghted by two exa mples; GE and Handy & Hannan. The 1989 GE plan emly satisfies $Orne of thc req uire ments for an effective paeh ge, The shon comm gs o f the GE ptan are as folio"". I'm;t. the sioc k opllon component co" crin g 1,500
share > does nol domm ale the annual eash rela iner and meeting fees . In fact, the optlon grant IS made "'itho ut an y red uctIOn in the CX1Stlllg dircctor cOmpensatIOn , Th us, even if the opt,on s are wor thles s, dircctors wou ld benc lit sub stan lially from the olhcr cash compone ntl of lhe compensatIOn package, Seco nd. the vesting schedule for the OptiOnS >s inadequ ate on that " faits to erea te a long-term exposu re to corporate equIty ho lding, TI,c GE plan all ows directors to exercise Op!IOn grants 1Il four equa l armualmstallments and once the opHons are exe rclsed . there are no further restrictions on the sale of stock, A director who wishes to mmirmze h,s expos ure to GE equity cao exercISe whene"er possible and lITlInediatdy sell the shares obtained , We calc ulate that, at the mmmmm, thlS suategy w1l l expose the director to no more tha" ),750 shares
In the option contract.
The 1990 Handy & liannan plan IS pamc ularly egregio us and lade n w,th gravy . Th" plan o ffers options with a "" tional value of $12,000 ,,'hile maint"ininll Ihe d irector's cash relam,1' of S24JlOO. The plan Irn,refore mcreases dIrector eompcnsahon by 50%. Further. the opt,ons carry a low e;<ere;se price of $1 comparod to Ihe stock price of S13.50. Thus. these optIOns ha"c "" intd nsic value (I.e., the "aluc if exerclScd today) of approxlrnatdy 50% ot" the annual retainer. The fact that these options arc ,,,,Iuable m almosl all circums tances, unless the Slock price drops to belo w a dollar, .hould be a poor Slgnal to shareho lders and ,n' llIUlional m\'cstors. Our 'tudy of the firl l generation mceml\"l; plan. for dlRy tOrs md,cates lhal most plan, are f1aw~d They are~xces<lvely bonus -like and provide rew ards~vcn for poor pcr fonnance.
They have served to me-case director compensa tion SIgnIficantly . An lrnpama l observer IS left wondering whether the obj~ct of tho~xoroi,e is to mcreas~d,,""tor payor to increasc mcenhvã lignment betw~~n d,,~otors and ,har~holdcr,. Influemla l ent ies o f manag~"a l compensatIon, such as Gra~f CI)·sta1. have now start~d paying atte ntion to tho~qua l ly Impona nt i$Sue of d,rector compensation.
We do, however. note some positive trends in lh~des ign of these cotltraet'_ We note a sman but not~wortby convergence toward the ,deal contract. Mor~and mor~fir ms ar~r~qui"ng dir~clOrs tn make monetary sacrif.c~s to rece Ive valuable~qu ity-bas~d instrurn~ntS sucb as OptiOns . So me f,nns are e'-en makmg awards cond ll1onal on prIOr performance. Also. there tS an mcreasing sens itivity toward the n~~d to mc reas~share own~rshlp o f d"eClor~Qve r tim~by Impostng constraints on the IiqutdatlOn of lhe equity instruments. Fioally, In a di r~ct rtsrons~to Jensen' s ca ll, we a re see ing firms dramat ically increase the proportion of cquit}-bascd compensation to overall director compensamm: thIS IS~spe c ial1y true for technology finns such as D~H and Yahoo where the proportion is close to l OO" A Our a ss~ss"",m IS that th~s~cond pan of the revol ution is und~r way but has quite a way to go before ItS completion.
T oh le 1 I' lo n C ha r acttr istics By Yea r o f P roposa l, 19 88 -19 98
Charaoterlstics for 289~q u L1y-based compensa tIon pions fOf non-executlvc directors. Deferred compensation plans are nOl consid..~d 10 b<' mcent",,, compensa llOn plans. A gravy plan IS a plan Ihat provIdes d Lrectors with addmonal equity-based compl.'nS<lllOn wrtbcut requ inng tmdeotT 10 annual reta;ncr. Opuon plan' arc plans thai 1O,-olvc the uSC of optIons, A rnajonry ( 143) of the 152 opt Ion plans provides dneetors wilh pen<xhc ann ual awards of stock options ralher than a one·t; me award. A restricted share plan md Lcatl's either a f"mal restric ted stock plan or an incent ive plan involving the use of resale-restricted shares , Stock a"'"ard plans are plans that Irtvolvc the use of eommon sloch . t>lL~ed plans have both opnon amI shan:: compo nents. We e.~p 1am this phrnom enon by summarizing arguments frrun academicians and praCl iuoners.
The most eloquent prollOnet\t for incentL w pay IS MIchael Jensen who argues for substantial (>SI OO.OOO) ownership exposure by directors and for such own ership to rise over tllrn:. Addition.lly. Jensen calls for at least part of this own ership to be paid using the personal funds of d,rcctors. Such a conceptual framework for director pay also linds supports hum the Nahonal Association of Corporate Directors (NACD).
Although the prevailing , \,ltwentional wisdom is strongly sUPpo"ivc, thc," is a "alid concern that firms 100 often des'gIl these eompcnsatlOn arrangements ineffectively. provldmg 'payoffs' to the directors that would increase their compensation regardless of fmn performance, n us has led noted ,n n,s of uecutlv" , 0mpt'l1,atTOn soch as Graef Crystal to focus On dlreetor compensation and qll"st;on II' h"thcr directo rs are "aming th" it 'kccp' , We tdcntdy three Important Issues regardIng the dCSL gn of dire, tor tn,ent""C compensation arrangements. First. tinn~need 10 decide on II'hether 10 use options or shares_We show thal the risk·rcward profIle dIffer. ror thcse twO altemat;"cs lIIld that options olTer a more S'-'TI, ;ti"e profIle. Options also allow deSIgn flexibllny in thal th, excrcise pn, c can be tailored to n eate an optimal amount of tn, ent,,·es. Second. finns need to detcrmme the proportion of the compensation attributable to past perfonnanee (b<.>nus eompon"n\) and the proport ion attrib utable to future pcrfonnanee (ineentive ,omponent), Superfielally it might appear ", though the lalter must dominate, but there is a case 10 be made for a bonus component: for example. f,nns may vary the n" mber of share, or options to relleet past performance. Third. and perhaps most
